To reason the interaction between agents' epistemic states and environments, the agents' epistemic states should include ontologies of agents (the agents' assumptions about environments), what the agents know, believe and desire, and also should include the agents' interpretations about these symbols in ontologies onto the environments. A formal description of such agents' epistemic states and several examples are given to show how such a description can be used to explain the puzzles in reasoning the modal sentences. For example, a sentence holding in a structure may have different consequences reasoned by different agents, because of the different epistemic states.
Introduction
Multi-agent VSK logic ( [1] , [2] ) is a multi-modal logic for reasoning about the epistemic states of agents in some environment. The logic is used to represent information visible, perceived and known to agents in an external environment and an agents' internal environment (epistemic state). Because the VSK logic is based on the propositional logic, it cannot express the interaction between agents' epistemic states and environments in which the agents are. What the agents perceive may change what the agents believe, know and desire; and what the agents' ontologies ( [3] , [4] ) and interpretation of symbols in the ontologies may change the interpretation of statements holding in the environments.
An epistemic state of an agent in an environment includes statements about the real world, where the statements are interpreted in terms of the agent's own interpretation. It determines the interpretation of statements about the environment; and the environment changes what the agent perceives, hence, what the agent believes, knows and desires. Hence, an environment interacts with the epistemic states of the agent in the environment. Based on the above discussion, we shall give a logical description of agents' epistemic states and environments.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives a formal definition of symbols representing the agents' epistemic states; in section 3, we give the interpretations of symbols and formulas in structures (environments), and the definition of inconsistency between what are true in structures and agents' epistemic states; section 4 uses examples to resolve the puzzles in modal logic. The last section concludes the paper.
The Epistemic States
An epistemic state E a of an agent a should include the following ingredients:
• a logical language L which is sharable and common to every agent.
• an ontology O a of agent a, where O a consists of a set C a ⊆ L of names (concepts, denoted by α, β, etc.), a binary relation on C a (the subsumption relation), and a function F a such that every name (concept) α is associated with a frame F a α , where F a α contains statements (formulas in L) about α which are known or assumed by agent a. Define α ≡ β if α β and β α.
• a set K a of statements known to agent a; B a believed by agent a; D a desired by agent a.
• an interpretation function I a such that for any structure M (an environment), there is an interpretation I a maps a name in L onto M .
• a set W of possible world (structure) names M. Assume that there is an ontology O and interpretation I independent of any agent.
Remark 2.1. The statements in F a α are different from these in K a in that when agent a communicates with other agents, a assumes that F a α is known to other agents; but K a may not be known to other agents.
Here, we assume that L and structures M are independent of agents. Any formula in L is called a statement.
The language L for representing epistemic states of agents consists of • L as a sub-language;
• a set A of agents;
• epistemic modals K a , B a and K a for every a ∈ A;
• a symbol I a for every a ∈ A; • a set W of possible world names.
For any a ∈ A, a should be a term. Because a occurs only as a subscript of K a , B a , D a or I a , a is not taken as a term any more.
Definition 2.3. A string ϕ of symbols is a formula in L if either
• ϕ is a statement in L (given a structure M and an interpretation I, ϕ is interpreted to be a property on M ); or
where ψ is a statement in L or formula in L (given a structure M and an interpretation I a , K a , B a and D a are interpreted to be sets of properties about M ); or
, where t, s are terms in L and ψ is a formula in L (given a structure M, I a is interpreted as an interpretation I a , hence, I a can be taken as a function from structures to interpretations); or
We can list some axioms about modals, such as:
are not taken as modalities as in the BDI logic, but as sets of sentences. There are two reasons: one is to avoid using the possible world semantics, which is not compatible very well with our intuition that what a believes is just a set of statements. Another reason is that there is no appropriate modal predicate logic for the multi-agent systems, because of the propositional attitude reports ( [5] ).
3.
Interpretations I and I a Given a structure M, assume that agent a is among M, that is, a is an object in M. There is an interpretation I independent of any agents, and an interpretation I a for an agent a, where I a satisfies the following conditions:
Let T h I (M ) be the statements in L which are true in M under interpretation I, that is, T h I (M ) = {ϕ ∈ L : M, I |= ϕ}. For the convenience, we assume that T h Ia (M ) = T h Ia (P a,M ), where P a,M is a sub-structure of M that agent a can perceive. I a maps every concept α in C a to be a set of objects in M, denoted by I a (α), such that for any a ∈ M, if a ∈ I a (α) then we say that a is an instance of α in M under interpretation I a . Definition 3.1. Given a sentence ϕ and a structure M, we define the satisfaction of ϕ in M as follows: Notice that the revision done by a is not based on the inconsistence of I a (K a ) and T h I (M ), but on the inconsistence of I a (K a ) and T h Ia (M ). Because a knows that there is an incorrect statement in K a , B a or D a , not because of the inconsistence between I a (K a ) and T h I (M ) (a does not know T h I (M )), but because of the inconsistence between I a (K a ) and
Examples
In this section we give several examples to show how to use the description given above to reason what agents' know and what we know the agents' know. Because I(α) ∈ P a,Mm and I(β) ∈ P a,Mm , agent a does not know α = β by perceiving α, so that agent a think that a need not revise K a and O a , because
In the common ontology O, we assume α, β ∈ C, and α β, β α ∈ O. Notice that O may not be a perfect and complete ontology for the real world.
Even though the logical language L used to represent the real world is same to agents, conflicts and misunderstanding between agents may be resulted in by the difference in the following factors: (1) the statements about a concept; (ii) K a , B a , D a and I a ; and (iii) the environments perceived.
Because of the differences, a statement ϕ in L may be interpreted in different ways for different agents, i.e., it is possible that for some agents a and b, M, I |= ϕ; M, I a |= ϕ and M, I b |= ϕ. Example 4.2. Given a structure M and two agents a and b, it is possible 
Hence, the statement that b see the evening star in the morning is true in M m for agent b, but false in M m for agent a.
To explain that even when the universes in P a,M and P b,M are equal, as a structure, P a,M may not be equal to P b,M , we use the following Example 4.3. Let M be a structure consisting of a cubic object x which has one hole in three faces and no hole in other three faces. Assume that three faces with one hole, say x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , are perceived only by agent a; and other three faces without hole, say x 4 , x 5 , x 6 , are perceived only by agent b. Hence, defaultly, agent a think that every face of the cube has one hold on it, let h 1 , h 2 , ..., h 6 be the holes on x 1 , x 2 , ..., x 6 imaged by agent a; and agent b think that there is no hole on any face of the cube. Hence, a,M , x 2,a,M , ..., x 6,a,M ∈ O a ; x 1,b,M , x 2,b,M , . ..,
Let on(x, y) denote a relation symbol that x is on y. Then,
Conclusions
According to the difference of ontologies and interpretations of different agents, we can represent the agent' epistemic states in a more natural way which is similar to the way we perceive and revise our knowledge. The agents are in environments and perceive some properties holding in the environments, where the properties are interpreted by the agents under their own interpretations. Such a representation of epistemic states gives a natural way to describe the belief revision. An agent realizes to revise its belief set when the agent in some environment interprets its beliefs in an inconsistent way. Hence, the agent may not revise its belief set once when its belief set is inconsistent with the properties holding in a structure, as explained in the classical theory of belief revision, because the inconsistence may not be perceivable to the agent.
Further works should include the axiom systems for interpretations I and I a ; the theory of belief revision based on interpretations I and I a ; and the applications to emotional agents and the representation of speech acts.
